



Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Lessons Learned


**Lieutenant General Norton A. Schwartz,
USAF
Director of Operations
J-3**

**This briefing is
UNCLASSIFIED**

- **Provide information on Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) Lessons Learned (LL)**
 - **Provide OIF LL Collection Plan Overview**
 - **CENTCOM Commander testimony**
 - **Alliance And Coalition Warfare**
 - **Strategic Communication (Information Operations/Public Diplomacy/Public Affairs)**
 - **Post Conflict Stability Operations Planning & Transition**
 - **Conclusion - areas requiring additional effort**

OIF Lessons Learned Collection Plan Overview

COLLECTION EFFORTS



CENTCOM Commander OIF Lessons Learned

- **Maturing of joint force operations**
 - **OSW, ONW and OEF contributed to the jointness and the culture within the headquarters of our area.**
 - **Helped to improve our interoperability.**
 - **Helped to improve our command, control, communications, computer and intelligence networking.**
- **Operational objectives achieved through integration of maneuver forces, Special Operations Forces, other government agency assets, precision lethal & non-lethal fires.**
- **Ability of Special Operators to use conventional forces to set conditions for the success.**
- **Jointness, precision munitions, command and control, the readiness of our equipment, the state of training of our troops and coalition support as very clear wi**

CENTCOM Commander OIF Lessons Learned



- **Areas that require additional work:**
 - **Fratricide prevention suffered from a lack of standardized combat identification.**
 - **Deployment planning and execution were cumbersome and were much more closely akin to those required during the Cold War than to those required for force projection by our country in the 21st century.**
 - **Coalition information-sharing needs to be improved at all levels.**
 - **Human intelligence and communications bandwidth also represent areas where we're going to be required to focus effort in the future.**

Alliance And Coalition Warfare

- Continue to expand definition of “joint” to include coalition, agency, and NGO operations - all are required to achieve end state
- **Early assignment**/co-location of Interagency and Coalition personnel to Combatant Command HQ is critical to building Joint war fighting and planning team
- Must continue improving **information** and **network** sharing capabilities with allies and agencies
- Must always consider **requisite lift, sustainment, support**, and **C2** issues required for coalition partners.
Examples:
 - Blue Force Tracking
 - Air to Ground Operations (CAS Procedures, Joint Terminal Attack Control)

Stability Contributors

Countries with forces in Iraq


- Albania
- Azerbaijan
- Bulgaria
- Czech Rep
- Denmark
- Dom Rep
- El Salvador
- Estonia
- Georgia
- Honduras
- Hungary
- Italy
- Kazakhstan
- Korea
- Latvia
- Lithuania
- Macedonia
- Moldova
- Mongolia
- Netherlands
- New Zealand
- Nicaragua
- Norway
- Philippines
- Poland
- Portugal
- Romania
- Slovakia
- Spain
- Thailand
- Ukraine
- UK

TOTAL ~24,000

32

Countries considering
decision to provide
forces **12** a **TOTAL TBD**

OVERALL SECURITY FORCE BREAKDOWN



Total Forces = 306,867

■ Coalition Forces ■ Iraqi Forces ■ US Forces

44
Countries
Potentially
Supporting Iraqi
Stability and
Humanitarian

As of 09 Dec 03

- Strategic Communication actions require a governmental lead to coordinate a **consistent strategic message** among the agencies and coalition partners
- Operational Information Operations (IO) Campaign was a success, but must further analyze measures of effectiveness associated with actions
- Plan IO throughout Post Conflict Stability Operations Phase
- Must improve the operational and strategic ability to rapidly counter disinformation...friendly and enemy
- Embedded media a success, but must prepare for exploiting (and countering) news (and rumors) linked to the 24/7 news cycle

Post Conflict Stability Operations

- **Expand Joint doctrine on transition from combat to Stability Operations; incorporate Stability Operations into Joint Exercises**
- **Must conduct planning for post-war Stability Operations prior to combat operations, *due to extensive interagency and coalition coordination requirements*, and have plan for transition.... Incorporate into deliberate war plans**
- **Need to conduct strategic war gaming for future Stability Operations planning, and integrate requirements into strategic gaming**
- ***For effective coalition participation, must include partners in Stabilization and Reconstruction planning***
- **Eliminate “Phase IV” terminology - change mindset to include Stability Operations Planning and Execution as a strategic prerequisite for victory**

Conclusion - Interoperability Lessons



- **OIF Lessons show the need for continued work in these areas:**
 - **Command and Control Collaboration Tools and Information Sharing**
 - **Common Situational Awareness**
 - **Multinational logistics and in transit visibility**
 - **Leveraging coalition linguistic capabilities**



Chairman's Intent

My intent is to identify and thoroughly analyze Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Lessons and incorporate the results into action plans to improve our country's warfighting strategy and preparedness for future conflict.

Strategic - SECDEF OIF Lessons Learned

- “Lessons learned” process began before the war.
- The importance of *speed*, and the ability to get inside the enemy’s decision cycle and strike before he is able to mount a coherent defense;
- The importance of *jointness*, and the ability of U.S. forces to fight, not as individual de-conflicted services, but as a truly joint force-maximizing the power and lethality they bring to bear;
- The importance of *intelligence*-and the ability to act on intelligence rapidly, in minutes, instead of days and even hours;
- The importance of *precision*, and the ability to deliver devastating damage to enemy positions, while sparing civilian lives and the civilian infrastructure;
- In the 21st century “overmatching power” is more important than “overwhelming force.”